

people. Does Count APPONYI mean autonomy for all of them, or for only the small Magyarized official class?

Better economic relations between the Danube countries are certainly desirable, though it must be remembered that Hungary's best outlet to the sea, through Fiume, has so far been blocked by Italy rather than by any of the succession States. As to general disarmament in the Danube basin, that must depend largely on Hungary. The Bethlen Government is trying to suppress the reactionary terrorists, but every now and then some Magyar statesman who thinks more of drawing a cheer from the crowd than of getting a loan abroad blows up and talks about carrying the flag back to the old frontiers. So long as this sort of thing goes on the neighbors of Hungary will be slow to disarm.

Count APPONYI writes that the question of "legitimate monarchy," that is of the restoration of the Hapsburgs to the Hungarian throne, is a matter which concerns Hungarians only. But the Hapsburgs, with their tradition of empire over Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Serbs, Croats, Slovenes and Rumanians, are a menace to all the succession States, as was made plain enough when the late CHARLES tried to go back to Budapest. So long as Magyars support a Prince who is virtually a pretender to all the neighboring thrones, they can hardly expect their neighbors to embrace them with fraternal enthusiasm.

APPONYI AND CENTRAL EUROPE.

Count APPONYI'S visit to the United States yielded many pleasant personal impressions, but added little to our knowledge of the problems of Central Europe. That he was sympathetically received by American capitalists who had taken a speculative chance in buying up the claims of Austrian and Hungarian aristocrats to landed property expropriated by the succession States was natural, but more disinterested observers found it hard to catch the force of his sincere and earnest arguments.

In his letter to THE TIMES, published last Monday as he was sailing for Europe, Count APPONYI repeated his opinion that revision of the treaties is necessary, though it is not practically possible now or in the near future. All he asks is that the treaties be enforced, especially with regard to the rights of racial minorities. According to the bulk of the evidence available, minority races are better treated in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, and on the whole in Rumania, than are the several hundred thousand Slovaks and Rumanians left in reduced Hungary. We are told that Slovaks and Rumanians ask for no minority rights in Hungary, which may be true, since up till lately any such request would have been likely to lead to a visit from the Magyar Ku Klux Klan organizations. But we were also assured (by Magyars) before and during the war that none of the minority races was at all dissatisfied with its lot in Hungary. The one statement is probably as correct as the other.

Count APPONYI suggests as a minimum program for the present, besides general protection for racial minorities, the opening of a route to the sea for Hungarian trade, the self-government of the Hungarian Szeklers of Transylvania and "the Ukrainians in Czechoslovakia," better economic relations and general disarmament. The Szeklers are a compact bloc of several hundred thousand people, Magyar in blood, in Southeastern Transylvania, entirely surrounded by a population predominantly Rumanian. It should be possible to give them a certain local autonomy without prejudicing the union of Rumania and Transylvania; but it remains doubtful whether that would satisfy the Magyars who still dream of the old frontiers. Assuming that the "Ukrainians of Czechoslovakia" are the people of Sub-Carpathian Russia, their autonomy is provided for by the Czechoslovak Constitution. If it is still more theoretical than actual, that is because the immediate problem was to get the people fed. The Czechoslovaks are trying to make Sub-Carpathian Russia self-supporting and to educate the